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Abstract
We derive several comparative-static results for Cournot games when firms have nonconstant
marginal-cost curves which shift exogenously. The results permit us to rank certain vectors of
equilibrium marginal costs with the same component sum according to their associated social
surplus or industry profit. We arrange the components of each vector in ascending order and
then construct from the resulting ordered vector its associated Lorenz curve. We show that if
two Lorenz curves do not cross, the one reflecting greater inequality is associated with higher
social surplus and industry profit. A duality result permits a corresponding ranking of equilib-
rium output vectors. The same partial ordering is used in the literature on income inequality to
rank certain distributions of income and in the literature on decision-making under uncertainty
to compare the riskiness of certain probability distributions with the same mean.
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I Introduction
In comparisons of two distributions of income with the same mean, one distribution is said to
exhibit greater income inequality if its associated Lorenz curve lies everywhere weakly below the
Lorenz curve of the other (Lorenz, 1905; Dalton, 1920). In comparisons of two random variables
with the same mean, one random variable is said to be more variable than the other if the former
can be obtained from the latter by a finite sequence of mean-preserving spreads (Rothschild-Stiglitz,
1970, 1971). Although developed independently in the economics literature on income inequality
and the literature on uncertainty, the Lorenz criterion as a measure of income inequality and mean-
preserving spreads as a measure of riskiness are closely related. Their relationship was first clarified
by Atkinson (1970) with subsequent contributions by Dasgupta et al. (1973) and Rothschild-Stiglitz
(1973): the Lorenz curves of two ascending vectors do not cross if and only if the vector whose
Lorenz curve reflects greater inequality can be obtained from the other vector by a finite sequence
of mean-preserving spreads and permutations. Fields-Fei (1978) showed that this same result can
be obtained without any permutations by using a subset of mean-preserving spreads which preserve
the order of the vector. These economics literatures were foreshadowed by mathematics literature
on the theory of majorization first formulated by Muirhead (1903) at the turn of the century and
then generalized by Hardy et. al. (1934,1952) three decades later.1
In this paper, we show how these same tools of mean-preserving spreads and Lorenz curves, so
useful in other contexts, can be utilized to address two unresolved issues in industrial organization.
Previous literature on Cournot oligopoly (Bergstrom-Varian, 1985a,b; Salant-Shaffer, 1998, 1999)
has established that the qualitative effects of certain exogenous shifts in marginal-cost curves on
industry profit and social surplus can be deduced from the sign of the change in the variance of the
equilibrium marginal-cost vector. As shown in the next section, however, the change in variance
ceases to be a reliable guide once the assumption is relaxed that marginal-cost curves are linear with
a weakly positive, common slope. The first contribution of our paper is to show for a more general
class of marginal-cost curves that analogous positive and normative conclusions can sometimes
1For a survey of the mathematics literature with a particularly accessible introduction, see Marshall-Olkin (1979).
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be drawn by examining instead the Lorenz curves associated with the equilibrium marginal-cost
vectors or, by duality, with the equilibrium output vectors. Although Lorenz curves provide no
guidance about changes in industry profit and social surplus when such curves cross, they provide
reliable guidance when they do not.
The second contribution of our paper concerns the economic implications of changes in indices
of industrial concentration. Previous literature on industrial concentration (Encaoua-Jacquemin,
1980) treated as axiomatic that an index of concentration should increase if the distribution of
the market shares of firms in an industry undergoes a mean preserving spread toward the tails
of the distribution. The so-called Herfindahl-Hirschman and the entropy indices both satisfy this
condition. An increase in such indices is typically taken by the antitrust authorities as a signal that
economic welfare has declined.2 Tirole (1989, p. 223) has pointed out, however, that such indices
have “no systematic relationship with economic variables of interest...” and thus may be unreliable
as a welfare indicator. Our analysis reinforces Tirole’s observation. Within the context of our model,
any shifts in marginal-cost curves which result in a mean-preserving spread in realized marginal
costs or outputs must strictly increase every Encaoua-Jacquemin index of industrial concentration
while at the same time strictly increasing social surplus. This finding casts doubt on the use of
any index in this class to signal a problem in industrial performance.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we show which of the conventional results in
the special case of linear marginal-cost curves with a weakly positive, common slope generalize and
which do not. In section III, we discuss the concepts of order-creating progressive permutations and
order-preserving regressive transfers and derive their effects on industry costs and hence industry
profit and social surplus. We also consider the effect of sequences of these transformations and relate
them to the mathematical concept of majorization, which has been widely used in the literatures
on income inequality and uncertainty. In section IV, we show how our results can be applied to
vectors of equilibrium outputs. Section V concludes the paper.
2The Herfindahl-Hirschman index has received greater prominence than other measures of industrial concentration
in the deliberation of the federal enforcement agencies and the courts. See Antitrust Law Developments (American
Bar Association Antitrust Section, 1992 pp. 302-03), the U.S. Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1992)
[reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (Commerce Clearing House, 1992 ¶13,103)] and FTC v. Bass Bros. Enters., 1984-1
Trade Cases (Commerce Clearing House, 1994 p. 68,609, ¶66,041)(N.D. Ohio 1984).
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II What Comparative-Statics Results Extend in the Absence of
Constant Marginal Costs?3
Suppose n (≥ 2) firms play a Cournot game. Assume firm i ∈ {1, . . .n} has no fixed costs and
denote its marginal cost as ci(qi). Assume ci(qi) ≥ 0 for all qi ≥ 0. Denote the inverse demand
as P (Q), where Q =
∑n
i=1 qi is industry output. Assume P (Q) ≥ 0 for all Q ≥ 0. Then firm
i’s profit is P (Q)qi −
∫ qi
0 ci(u)du. Assume ci(qi) and P (Q) are twice continuously differentiable,
with c′i(qi) ≥ 0 for all qi ≥ 0 and P
′(Q) < 0 for all Q such that P (Q) > 0. Assume firm i’s
marginal revenue is everywhere decreasing in each rival’s output: P ′(Q) + P ′′(Q)qi < 0 for all
qi ∈ [0, Q]. These assumptions ensure the existence of a unique pure-strategy Cournot equilibrium
(Gaudet-Salant, 1991).
Assume each firm produces a strictly positive output (qi > 0) in equilibrium. We refer to this
as an “interior equilibrium.” Denote equilibrium quantities by asterisks (Q∗, q∗i ). These quantities
are determined by the n first-order conditions: P (Q∗)+P ′(Q∗)q∗i − ci(q
∗
i ) = 0. We refer to firm i’s
marginal cost evaluated at its equilibrium quantity as its “realized marginal cost.” It follows that a
firm with a strictly higher realized marginal cost will have a strictly lower equilibrium output and
two firms with the same realized marginal cost will have the same equilibrium output. Summing
the n first-order conditions to obtain nP (Q∗)+Q∗P ′(Q∗) =
∑n
i=1 ci(q
∗
i ) yields a second implication:
Proposition 1: Industry output in any interior Cournot equilibrium depends only on the sum of
the realized marginal costs and not on the distribution of those costs.
Proposition 1 generalizes the result in Bergstrom-Varian (1985 a,b) to non-constant marginal
costs. It follows that if exogenous shifts in the marginal-cost curves cause the realized marginal costs
of the n firms to change in a way which preserves their sum, then industry output will be unchanged
(assuming an interior equilibrium). Moreover, output will contract at each firm experiencing an
increase in its realized marginal cost and expand at each firm experiencing a decrease in its realized
marginal cost; there will be no change in the output of a firm with unchanged realized marginal
3Everything we say about the case of constant marginal costs holds as well in the more general case of linear
marginal-cost curves with a weakly positive, common slope.
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cost. When the shifts in the marginal-cost curves are caused by changes in production technologies,
these characteristics of Cournot-equilibrium have an important comparative-static implication for
industry profit (industry revenue less industry production costs) and social surplus (gross consumer
surplus less industry production costs). We state this implication in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose exogenous real shifts in the marginal-cost curves cause the realized
marginal costs of the n firms to change in a way which (1) preserves their sum and (2) results
in a new interior Cournot equilibrium. Then industry profit and social surplus both increase
(respectively, decrease) by the amount of the reduction (respectively, increase) in industry costs.
Proof: Industry profit and social surplus are respectively defined as QP (Q) −
∑n
i=1
∫ qi
0 ci(u)du
and
∫Q
0 P (u)du−
∑n
i=1
∫ qi
0 ci(u)du, where QP (Q) is industry revenue,
∫ Q
0 P (u)du is gross consumer
surplus, and
∑n
i=1
∫ qi
0 ci(u)du is industry cost. The result follows immediately since, under the two
hypotheses, the first term in each expression is constant (Proposition 1). 2
Proposition 2 generalizes the result in Salant-Shaffer (1999, p. 588) to non-constant marginal
costs. When the cost shifts are real, it permits a complete ordering in terms of industry profit
and social surplus of all industry-wide vectors of realized marginal costs with the same number
of components and component sum (provided they induce an interior Cournot equilibrium); the
ordering of industry profit and social surplus is inversely related to the ordering of industry costs.
In our previous paper, we showed (Corollary 4 of Salant-Shaffer, 1999) that a Cournot equilib-
rium in which n firms have identical constant marginal costs has larger industry cost and hence
smaller industry profit and social surplus than any interior equilibrium with the same marginal-cost
sum where the variance of the marginal costs is strictly positive. A related result can be obtained
in the absence of constant marginal costs by iteratively applying the following proposition:4
Proposition 3: Assume that in the initial n-firm Cournot equilibrium there exists some subset of
firms with identical realized marginal costs. Assume, moreover, that within that subset there exist
two firms (i and j) such that if firm i increases its output by x and firm j decreases its output by
x for some x > 0, the sum of the induced changes in their two marginal costs would be weakly
positive. Assume, finally, that the marginal-cost curves of firm i and j are vertically shifted (with
4Proposition 8 below generalizes Corollary 4 of Salant-Shaffer (1999).
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no shift in the marginal-cost curves of the other firms) in such a way that in the new equilibrium
firm i expands by x > 0 and firm j contracts by x. Then such shifts must strictly lower industry
cost and must strictly raise industry profit and social surplus.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 has broad application even if marginal-cost curves are not everywhere differen-
tiable. Its conditions always hold if marginal-cost curves are weakly increasing and weakly convex.
Indeed, these conditions can sometimes be satisfied even when marginal-cost curves are weakly
concave.5
We can apply Proposition 3 to an initial vector of realized marginal costs with identical com-
ponents. We can then continue to apply it iteratively until no two firms remain with the same
realized marginal cost. This final vector of marginal costs will have the same component sum as
the initial vector. But since industry cost strictly declines at every iteration, the final equilibrium
has a strictly larger profit and social surplus than the initial vector. This does not establish that
every vector with a strictly positive variance and the same component sum will have a strictly
larger profit and social surplus than the vector of identical realized marginal costs, but it leaves
open that possibility.
In the well-studied case of constant marginal costs, comparisons can be made even when neither
marginal cost vector has identical components. In the case of constant marginal costs, whenever
any two marginal-cost vectors have the same component sum, the one with the larger variance is
associated with the smaller industry cost and hence the larger industry profit and social surplus.
To establish whether this result generalizes, we express industry cost as a function of the n realized
marginal costs, which we henceforth denote θi = ci(q
∗
i ) for i = 1, . . . , n. To do so, simply sum each
firm’s total cost, expressed as the area under its marginal-cost curve:
C =
n∑
i=1
∫ P−θi
−P ′
0
ci(u)du, (1)
where the upper limit of the definite integral equals firm i’s equilibrium output (q∗i =
P−θi
−P ′
for
5If the marginal-cost curve of every firm is a weakly convex, increasing function, then one can pick any two firms
with the same initial realized marginal cost and any x > 0. By designating as i the firm which would experience
the larger marginal-cost increase if it expanded by x, one can always satisfy the conditions of the proposition. The
conditions can sometimes be satisfied when marginal-cost curves are increasing but concave if x is suitably chosen.
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i = 1, . . . , n). When each firm has a constant marginal cost of production, (1) simplifies dramatically
to C = 1
−P ′
(P
∑
θi −
∑
θ2i ), yielding the following implication: when the marginal costs of the n
firms change in a way that preserves their sum and results in a new interior Cournot equilibrium,
industry costs are strictly lower if and only if the sum of the squared marginal costs of the n firms
or, equivalently, the variance of their marginal costs is larger (Proposition 1 of Salant-Shaffer, 1999).
Given the straightforward extension of the results so far when the assumption of constant
marginal costs is relaxed, one might anticipate that this “variance” proposition extends in a similar
way. Unfortunately it does not. For assume marginal-cost curves have the following form: ci(qi) =
ai + dq
k
i , where ai ≥ 0, d ≥ 0, and k ≥ 1.
6 Then, for d = 0 or d > 0 and k = 1, C is strictly
decreasing in
∑n
i=1 θ
2
i and does not depend on terms of θi to higher powers. One can then rank the
industry cost associated with alternative realized marginal-cost vectors with the same sum using
the variance of such vectors as the literature suggests (Salant-Shaffer, 1999).7 If k = 2, however,
industry cost is still strictly decreasing in
∑n
i=1 θ
2
i but is also strictly increasing in
∑n
i=1 θ
3
i . Then
just because two realized marginal-cost vectors have the same sum of squared components and
the same component sum does not imply that industry costs are identical. Consider the realized
marginal-cost vectors (2,2,5) and (1,4,4). Even though these vectors have a common component
sum (
∑n
i=1 θi = 9) and a common sum of squared components (
∑n
i=1 θ
2
i = 33, ) nonetheless (2,2,5)
has the larger sum of cubed components (
∑n
i=1 θ
3
i = 141 > 129). It follows that if k = 2, the vector
(2,2,5) must induce a strictly larger industry cost in the interior Cournot equilibrium.8 Conversely,
6Substituting into (1) and simplifying we obtain:
C =
1
−P ′
(
P
n∑
i=1
θi −
n∑
i=1
θ
2
i −
d
(−P ′)k
k
k + 1
n∑
i=1
(P − θi)
k+1
)
.
To derive this conclusion, let Ci denote firm i’s total cost in the Cournot equilibrium. Substituting for ci(qi) and
evaluating the definite integral in (1), we obtain: Ci = ai(
P−θi
−P ′
) + d
k+1 (
P−θi
−P ′
)k+1. Substituting for ai, this becomes:
Ci =
[
θi − d
(P−θi)
k
(−P ′)k
]
(P−θi
−P ′
) + d
k+1 (
P−θi
−P ′
)k+1, which simplifies to Ci =
1
−P ′
(
Pθi − θ
2
i −
d
(−P ′)k
k
k+1 (P − θi)
k+1
)
.
Summing over the n firms to get C =
∑n
i=1
Ci yields the displayed equation.
7Salant-Shaffer (1999, footnote 23) point out that when marginal-cost curves are upward-sloping lines of the same
slope, ci(qi) = ai + dqi, the industry cost can be written as a function of
∑n
i=1
ai and
∑n
i=1
a2i . The assertion here
is that realized marginal costs can be used instead of the intercept terms.
8To elaborate on this example, assume the inverse demand is P (Q) = 15 − Q, firm i’s marginal cost is ci(qi) =
ai+ .04q
2
i , i = 1, 2, 3, and (a1, a2, a3) = (1.36, 1.36, 4.96). Then in equilibrium the output vector is (4, 4, 1), the vector
of realized marginal costs is (2, 2, 5), and industry cost is 17.56. Suppose the marginal-cost functions shift exogenously
so that (a1, a2, a3)=(0,3.84,3.84). Then in the new equilibrium, the output vector changes to (5, 2, 2), the realized
marginal-cost vector becomes (1, 4, 4) and industry costs fall to 17.24. Industry costs are thus higher when the realized
6
if one vector of realized marginal costs has a strictly higher variance but the same component
sum, one cannot conclude that it is associated with the lower industry cost. Consider the realized
marginal-cost vectors (2 − , 2, 5 + ) and (1, 4, 4), obtained by perturbing the previous example.
Then the sum of the components in the new initial vector is unchanged but the sum of its squared
components is increasing in  for  ≥ 0. Since the industry cost associated with (2 − , 2, 5 + ) is
continuous in , industry cost must remain strictly larger not merely for  = 0 but for sufficiently
small  > 0. These two examples suffice to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose exogenous real shifts in the marginal-cost curves cause the realized
marginal costs of the n firms to change in a way which (1) preserves their sum and (2) results
in a new interior Cournot equilibrium. Then a decrease in industry costs can occur without an
increase in the sum of squared realized marginal costs; conversely, if the sum of the squared realized
marginal costs does increase, industry costs need not be lower.
Although in the familiar case of parallel linear marginal-cost curves, a change which preserves the
sum of the components of the vector of realized marginal costs strictly lowers industry costs if and
only if the sum of the squared components increases, neither the “if” nor the “only if” part of this
statement extends when the slope of the marginal-cost curves is not constant.
One can, of course, use the functional in (1) to determine the exact magnitude of industry costs.
But the inference requires knowing the entire marginal-cost function of each firm. An alternative
approach would be to compute the total differential dC from (1):
dC =
1
P ′
n∑
i=1
θidθi. (2)
This simple equation is useful since it relates local changes in realized marginal costs to local changes
in industry cost. One of its implications is that if two realized marginal costs are unequal, raising
infinitesimally the higher of two realized marginal costs while lowering the other by an offsetting
amount must reduce industry costs (since P ′ < 0). Using an alternative approach, we will verify
(in Proposition 6) that this qualitative result also holds for non-local changes in realized marginal
cost.
marginal costs are (2,2,5) even though the sum of the squared realized marginal costs is the same for the two vectors.
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However, the usefulness of this total differential has its limits. Serious error can result if it is
treated as valid for non-local changes. In fact, ∆C 6= 1
P ′
∑n
i=1 θi∆θi. To demonstrate that the two
sides are unequal, regard (2, 2, 5) as the initial vector of realized marginal costs and (1, 4, 4) as the
final vector of realized marginal costs. Then, as we have shown above with k = 2, the change in
industry cost is negative, ∆C < 0; but the right-hand side of this formula is strictly positive.9
To summarize, determining whether industry profit and social surplus have increased when real
exogenous shifts in marginal-cost curves leave industry output unchanged (and result in an interior
Cournot equilibrium) requires knowing the sign of the change in industry costs. When the slope
of each marginal-cost curve is a common constant, the sign of the change in industry costs may be
inferred from the sign of the change in the sum of the squared realized marginal costs (or variance of
the realized marginal costs). When the slope of the marginal-cost curves is not constant, however,
this statistic can be misleading. One alternative is to use instead the statistic 1
P ′
∑
θi∆θi. But
unless changes are infinitesimal, this statistic will also be misleading. Another alternative is to use
the functional in (1). However, that formula requires knowing the entire marginal-cost function of
each firm, information that may not be readily available to analysts and policy makers.
Below we propose a new way to determine the sign of the change in industry costs. A limitation
of the proposed method is that it sometimes yields no answer. When it does yield an answer, how-
ever, that answer is correct. The method we propose involves comparing Lorenz curves constructed
from ordered vectors of realized marginal costs. If the Lorenz curves do not cross (or equivalently,
if the vector of partial sums of each ordered vector can be Pareto ranked), the curve reflecting
greater inequality is associated with higher social surplus and industry profit. Since marginal-cost
realizations may be difficult to observe, we show in Section V a duality result: the same ordering
also applies to Lorenz curves constructed from ordered vectors of equilibrium firm outputs.
9Indeed both the sign and the magnitude of the right-hand side remain the same ( 3
−P ′
> 0) even if the role of the
initial and final vectors are interchanged. But this is obvious nonsense! Clearly each industry cost cannot be strictly
larger than the other.
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III Transformations of the Initial Vector of Realized Marginal
Costs
Preliminaries
In any comparison of two vectors of realized marginal costs with the same number of components
and component sum, what can we infer about industry costs in the two Cournot equilibria? As we
have seen, nothing can be said using the sum of squared components or differentials if the change
induced in realized marginal costs is non-local. However, if the realized marginal costs change
because the marginal-cost curves of firms are shifted vertically, it is sometimes possible merely by
inspecting the components of these vectors to determine which yields the lower industry costs, and
hence, the higher industry profit and social surplus.
Let cI = (c1(q1), . . . , cn(qn)) denote the initial vector of marginal-cost curves (evaluated at an
arbitrary (q1, . . . , qn)) and c
F = (c1(q1) + ∆1, . . . , cn(qn) + ∆n) the final vector of marginal-cost
curves, where we consider final vectors which are obtained from initial vectors by exogenous vertical
shifts in the components of cI. We denote these vertical shifts by the vector (∆1, . . . ,∆n).
Our previous assumptions imply that ci(qi) ≥ 0 for all qi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n. We restrict attention
to exogenous vertical shifts that belong to the set {(∆1, . . . ,∆n)|ci(0)+∆i ≥ 0 for i = 1, ...n}. Since
marginal-cost curves are assumed to be increasing, ci(qi) +∆i ≥ 0 for all qi ≥ 0, i = 1, ...n.
Let qI = (qI1 , . . . , q
I
n) and q
F = (qF1 , . . . , q
F
n ) denote the initial and final vectors of Cournot
equilibrium quantities, and let θI = (θI1, . . . , θ
I
n) and θ
F = (θF1 , . . . , θ
F
n ) denote the initial and final
vectors of realized marginal costs, where θIi = ci(q
I
i ) and θ
F
i = ci(q
F
i ) + ∆i, for i = 1, . . . , n. Our
assumptions imply that θI ∈ <n+ and θ
F ∈ <n+, where <
n
+ ≡ {(x1, . . . , xn)|xi ≥ 0 for all i}.
Lemma 1: Assume the initial and final equilibrium are interior. Then if the n initial marginal-cost
curves are vertically shifted in any way that results in a new interior equilibrium with the same
realized marginal-cost sum, the vector of shifts (∆1, . . . ,∆n) can be uniquely inferred from the final
vector of realized marginal costs (θF1 , . . . , θ
F
n ). Moreover, if θ
F
i
≥
< θ
I
i then ∆i
≥
< 0.
Proof: Since the realized marginal-cost sum is unchanged, the industry output remains Q∗. Given
θFi and the fact that the equilibrium is interior, we can infer firm i’s output from the first-order
9
condition: qFi =
P (Q∗)−θFi
−P ′(Q∗) . But this final output would induce a marginal cost different from the
given θFi unless firm i’s original marginal-cost curve shifted vertically by exactly ∆i = θ
F
i − ci(q
F
i ).
Hence, the underlying exogenous shifts (∆1, . . . ,∆n) are unique.
10 If the realized marginal cost at
firm i strictly increases (θFi > θ
I
i ) then that firm must strictly reduce production in order for its
perceived marginal revenue (P + qiP
′) to continue to equal the realized marginal cost. But since
its marginal cost is weakly increasing in its output, the realized marginal cost could increase when
output falls only if the marginal-cost curve of firm i shifts vertically upward (∆i > 0). Analogous
arguments establish that if θFi
≥
< θ
I
i , then ∆i
≥
< 0. 2
In what follows, we assume throughout that the marginal-cost curves of firms 1 to n belong to the
set of marginal-cost curves ξ, whose components are non-negative, twice continuously differentiable,
nondecreasing and weakly convex such that the slope of the marginal-cost curve of a firm with a
lower index is weakly larger than the slope of the marginal-cost curve of a firm with a higher index
when evaluated at the same point. More formally,
ξ ≡
{
(c1(q1), . . . , cn(qn))| ci(s) ≥ 0, c
′′
i (s) ≥ 0, c
′
i(s) ≥ c
′
j(s) ≥ 0, for all s ≥ 0, i < j, i, j ∈ (1, . . . , n)
}
.
The well-studied case of constant marginal costs is a member of this set, as is the class of functions
ci(qi) = ai + dq
k
i , k ≥ 1 and i = 1, ..., n, from which was drawn the example illustrating that
industry costs do not necessarily decrease when the variance of realized marginal costs increases.
Both of these examples fall within that subset of ξ where each firm’s marginal-cost curve is a
vertical translation of the same weakly increasing, weakly convex function.11
Order-Creating Progressive Permutations
One type of transformation that preserves the sum of the realized marginal costs occurs when two
marginal-cost curves shift vertically in opposite directions in such a way that in the new equilibrium
a permutation of the two realized marginal costs occurs, with no change in the realized marginal
10Reconsider the example in footnote 5, where P (Q) = 15−Q and ci(qi) = ai+.04q
2
i , i = 1, 2, 3. Recall that initially
(a1, a2, a3)=(1.36,1.36,4.96) and the resulting vector of realized marginal costs was (2,2,5). When the final vector of
realized marginal costs was (1, 4, 4), (a1, a2, a3)=(0,3.84,3.84). Hence, the unique vertical shifts which generates this
final vector of realized marginal costs is (∆1,∆2,∆3)=(0,3.84,3.84)-(1.36,1.36,4.96)=(-1.36, 2.48, -1.12).
11On first reading, some readers may prefer to focus on this subset of ξ before considering the more general case
where slopes of marginal-cost curves of different firms may differ at some common output.
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costs of the other firms. If in this transformation the marginal-cost curve of the firm with the smaller
index shifts down so that its realized marginal cost decreases, then we call the transformation an
“order-creating progressive permutation.”
Definition: A transfer of realized marginal cost from firm i to firm j, i < j, is an order-creating
progressive permutation if (1) firm i’s realized marginal cost decreases (θFi < θ
I
i ) and firm j’s
realized marginal cost increases (θFj > θ
I
j ) such that θ
F
i = θ
I
j and θ
I
i = θ
F
j , and (2) there is no
change in the remaining firms’ realized marginal costs (θFk = θ
I
k, k ∈ {1, ...n}, k 6= i, j).
The transformation of (13,5,22,3,10,7) to (3,5,22,13,10,7), for example, is an order-creating pro-
gressive permutation since only two components have been permuted and the firm with the smaller
index experiences a decrease in its realized marginal cost.12 The transformation is termed “pro-
gressive” because—like a progressive income tax—it lowers something higher and raises something
lower (realized marginal cost instead of income). Finally, the transformation is termed “order-
creating” because, as shown in Lemma 2 below, its repeated application can rearrange the initial
vector of realized marginal costs into ascending order—in our example to (3,5,7,10,13,22).
To demonstrate this, we adopt the following notation. For any vector g = (g1, . . . , gn), let g↑ be
obtained from g by reordering the components of g from lowest to highest. Denote the components
of g↑ as
(
g(1), . . . , g(n)
)
, where g(1) ≤ · · · ≤ g(n). We now present our lemma:
Lemma 2: Any vector g can be transformed to g↑ by a finite sequence of order-creating progressive
permutations.
Proof: Find the smallest component of g. If it does not have the index 1, assign to it the index
1 and assign its index to the component previously indexed as 1. Now find the second smallest
component of this transformation of g. If it does not have the index 2, assign to it the index 2 and
assign its index to the component previously indexed as 2 . . . After at most n−1 such order-creating
12On the other hand, the transformation of the first vector to (22,5,13,3,10,7) is not an order-creating progressive
permutation because the realized marginal cost of the firm with the smaller index shifts up.
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progressive permutations, g↑ will result. 2
Consider now the economic consequences of such a transformation. Since an order-creating pro-
gressive permutation leaves Q∗ and the equilibrium price unaffected, and since the largest realized
marginal cost is the same in θI and θF, it follows that if the final Cournot equilibrium is interior
then the initial Cournot equilibrium must also be interior.
Consider next the effects of such a transformation on the output of each firm. Since each firm
always adjusts its output in equilibrium so its perceived marginal revenue (P + qP ′) equals its
realized marginal cost and since under this transformation θFi = θ
I
j < θ
I
i = θ
F
j , it follows that
qFi = q
I
j > q
I
i = q
F
j . Hence the output of firm i, which is initially smaller than that of firm j,
expands in response to the downward shift in its marginal-cost curve until it reaches the initial
output level of firm j; similarly, the output of firm j contracts in response to the upward shift in
its marginal-cost curve until it reaches the initial output level of firm i.
We conclude our discussion of the economic effects of order-creating progressive permutations
by showing their effect on social surplus, industry profit, and industry cost.
Proposition 5: In any order-creating progressive permutation, if the final equilibrium is interior
then industry costs weakly decrease and hence industry profit and social surplus weakly increase.
Proof: Since the realized marginal costs of n−2 of the firms do not change, the equilibrium outputs
of these firms do not change—nor do their equilibrium costs of production. When calculating the
effect of an order-creating progressive permutation on industry costs, therefore, we can focus solely
on its effect on firms i and j. Thus, we can write the actual change in the n firms’ costs as:
∫ qFi
0
(ci(s) +∆i) ds +
∫ qFj
0
(cj(s) + ∆j) ds −
∫ qIi
0
ci(s) ds −
∫ qIj
0
cj(s) ds
=
∫ qIi
0
(∆i +∆j) ds +
∫ qIj
qI
i
(ci(s) +∆i − cj(s)) ds, (3)
where in the second line we have replaced final outputs using the fact that qFi = q
I
j > q
I
i = q
F
j .
The right-hand side of (3) decomposes the change in industry costs into the sum of two definite
integrals. Since the upper limit of each exceeds the lower limit, one can establish that industry
12
costs weakly decrease if one can show that each integrand is weakly negative over its range of
integration. Figure 1 will facilitate this demonstration.
Consider the first integrand in the second line. As discussed above, firm i expands its output
from qIi to q
I
j while firm j (> i) contracts its output over this same range—from q
I
j to q
I
i . Since
each marginal-cost curve is weakly convex and the marginal-cost curve of firm i is everywhere
weakly steeper, its output expansion must increase its induced marginal cost by at least as much
as the output contraction of firm j reduces its induced marginal cost. Consequently, the sum of
the induced marginal cost changes must be weakly positive as is reflected in the vertical distances
indicated in Figure 1. In order for the sum of the realized marginal costs nonetheless to remain
unchanged, the sum of the vertical shifts in the two marginal-cost curves (∆i +∆j) must be weakly
negative. Hence, the first definite integral in (3) must be weakly negative.
The second definite integral reflects the change in industry costs that occurs from having firm
i and not firm j produce the additional units from qIi to q
I
j . Its integrand is also weakly negative
since the final marginal-cost curve of firm i is everywhere weakly steeper and therefore must lie
below the initial marginal-cost curve of firm j to the left of qIj = q
F
i (where they must coincide).
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See the shaded area in Figure 1. 2
In the special case where every marginal-cost curve is a vertical translation of the same function,
each integrand on the right-hand side of (3) is zero. The first integrand is zero since the net
downward shift in the two marginal-cost curves must offset the net induced increase in the two
marginal costs; and since the latter must be zero under the circumstance posited, the former must
be zero as well. As for the second integrand, it will be zero since firm i’s marginal-cost curve after its
shift down will, in the circumstance posited, coincide with firm j’s initial marginal-cost curve. As a
consequence, order-creating progressive permutations of marginal-cost curves in ξ have no effect on
industry cost, profit, or social surplus. This implies that in the special cases of constant marginal
costs or the weakly increasing, weakly convex cost curves used in the discussion of Proposition 4,
such vertical shifts in the marginal-cost curves have no aggregate economic effects.
Order-Preserving Regressive Transfers
Another type of transformation that preserves the sum of the realized marginal costs occurs when
two marginal-cost curves shift vertically in opposite directions in such a way that in the new equilib-
rium the larger of two realized marginal costs increases by as much as the smaller of them decreases,
with no change in the realized marginal costs of the other firms. We define this transformation
only on realized marginal-cost vectors which weakly ascend. If the transformed vector also weakly
ascends, then we call the transformation an “order-preserving regressive transfer.”
Definition: Suppose the initial vector of realized marginal cost is in ascending order (θI = θI↑).
Then a transfer of realized marginal cost from firm i to firm j, i < j, is an order-preserving regressive
transfer if (1) firm i’s realized marginal cost decreases (θFi < θ
I
i ), firm j’s realized marginal cost
increases (θFj > θ
I
j ), and θ
F
i + θ
F
j = θ
I
i + θ
I
j , (2) there is no change in the remaining firms’ realized
marginal costs (θFk = θ
I
k, k ∈ {1, ...n}, k 6= i, j), and (3) the vector of realized marginal cost remains
in ascending order (θF = θF↑ ).
The transformation of (3,5,7,10,13,22) to (2,5,7,10,14,22), for example, is an order-preserving re-
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gressive transfer since two components change in equal and opposite directions and the smaller
of the two components is reduced.13 The transformation is termed “regressive” because—like a
regressive income tax—it raises something higher and lowers something smaller. Finally the trans-
formation is termed “order-preserving” because it transforms one weakly ascending vector into
another.
Given two ascending vectors of realized marginal costs, Fields-Fei (1978) have shown that it
possible to begin with one vector and, after a finite sequence of order-preserving regressive transfers,
to generate the other vector if and only if an easily verified condition holds.
Before presenting their condition, we need two definitions:
Definition: For g ∈ <n, the vector of partial sums of g is the n−tuple with kth component
∑k
i=1 g(i) for i = 1, . . . , k, where g(i) ≤ g(j) if i < j.
For example, to compute the vector of partial sums of g=(3,2,4), we first transform it to g↑=(2,3,4)
so that g(1) = 2, g(2) = 3, and g(3) = 4.We then compute the partial sums
∑1
i=1 g(i) = 2,
∑2
i=1 g(i) =
5, and
∑3
i=1 g(i) = 9. Hence, the vector of partial sums of g is (2,5,9).
Definition: For y, x ∈ <n, y is majorized by x (or, equivalently, x majorizes y), written y ≺ x,
if and only if either x↑ = y↑ or (1) the vector of partial sums of y Pareto dominates the vector of
partial sums of x and (2)
∑n
i=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 yi.
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For example, if y=(3,3,3) and x=(3,2,4) then x majorizes y since (3,6,9)—the vector of partial
sums of y—Pareto dominates (2,5,9)—the vector of partial sums of x and since y and x have the
same component sum.15
13On the other hand, the transformation of the first vector to (3, 5, 4, 10, 16, 22) is not an order-preserving regressive
transfer. While a smaller realized marginal cost in the first vector is reduced by as much as a larger realized marginal
cost is increased, the components of the transformed vector are no longer in ascending order.
14Condition (2) in this definition may seem unduly restrictive. When only the first condition holds, x is said to
weakly majorize y. The Appendix shows that our results do not generalize to weak majorization. Section V suggests,
however, how to use our majorization results when the sum of the realized marginal costs changes.
15The theory of majorization has previously been applied in the economics literature to decision-making under
uncertainty because of its relationship to mean-preserving spreads, and to income inequality because the partial sums
in its definition have a special relationship to the Lorenz curve. For example, if y ≺ x, then the distribution of
incomes in y is said to Lorenz dominate the distribution of incomes in x, leading to lower income inequality. The
precise relationship between majorization and Lorenz curves is as follows. Suppose y,x ∈ <n. Then y is majorized
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The precise relationship between majorization and order-preserving regressive transfers is given
in the following lemma which we attribute16 to Fields-Fei (1978, p. 309).17
Lemma 3: For x, y ∈ <n, if x↑ 6= y↑ then y is majorized by x if and only if x↑ can be obtained
from y↑ by a finite sequence of order-preserving regressive transfers.
Given two ascending vectors, one of which majorizes the other, the “only if” part of this lemma
establishes the existence of a finite sequence of order-preserving regressive transfers which will
transform the majorized vector into the majorizing vector.
Consider now the economic consequences of any order-preserving regressive transfer. Since
each transformation leaves Q∗ and the equilibrium price unaffected, and since the largest realized
marginal cost in θF weakly exceeds the largest realized marginal cost in θI, it follows that if the
final Cournot equilibrium is interior then the initial Cournot equilibrium must also be interior.
Consider next the effects of such a transformation on the output of each firm. Since each firm
always adjusts its output so its perceived marginal revenue (P + qP ′) equals its realized marginal
cost and since, under this transformation, θFi < θ
I
i < θ
I
j < θ
F
j , it follows that q
F
i > q
I
i > q
I
j > q
F
j .
Hence, the output of firm i, which is initially larger than that of firm j, expands in response to the
downward shift in its marginal-cost curve while the output of firm j, which was already smaller
initially, contracts in response to the upward shift in its marginal-cost curve.
We conclude our discussion of the economic effects of order-preserving regressive transfers by
showing their effect on social surplus, industry profit, and industry cost.
Proposition 6: In any order-preserving regressive transfer, if the final equilibrium is interior, then
by x if and only if the Lorenz curve of y dominates the Lorenz curve of x. See Rothschild-Stiglitz (1973).
16For the intellectual history of this result, see Foster (1985, p.49-50). Foster traces this proposition to Hardy et.
al. (1952) and discusses its tangled evolution over the ensuing 33 years.
17Fields-Fei (1978) showed that the Lorenz curve of y Lorenz dominates that of x if and only if x↑ can be obtained
from y↑ by a finite sequence of order-preserving regressive transfers. Lemma 3 then follows from the equivalence of
Lorenz domination and majorization (see footnote 11). Alternatively, we could have used the result in Rothschild-
Stiglitz (1973) and written Lemma 3 as “For x,y ∈ <n, if x↑ 6= y↑ then y is majorized by x if and only if x↑ can be
obtained from y↑ by a finite sequence of mean-preserving spreads and order-creating progressive permutations.” Our
results would be unchanged since applying a mean-preserving spread to an ascending vector followed immediately
by an order-creating progressive permutation will also always result in an ascending vector with a strictly lower
associated industry cost (Proposition 5 and 6).
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industry costs strictly decrease and hence industry profit and social surplus strictly increase.
Proof: When calculating the effect of a regressive transfer on industry costs, we can focus solely
on its effect on firms i and j. Thus, we can write the actual change in the n firms’ costs as:
∫ qFi
0
(ci(s) +∆i) ds +
∫ qFj
0
(cj(s) + ∆j) ds −
∫ qIi
0
ci(s) ds −
∫ qIj
0
cj(s) ds
=
∫ qI
i
qI
j
∆i ds +
∫ qI
j
0
(∆i +∆j) ds+
∫ qF
i
qI
i
(ci(s) +∆i) ds −
∫ qI
j
qF
j
(cj(s) + ∆j) ds. (4)
The right-hand side of (4) decomposes the change in industry costs into four definite integrals. The
first pair of integrals reflects the change in industry costs that would occur if the marginal-cost
curves were vertically shifted with no change in outputs. The upper limit of each integral exceeds
the lower limit. Hence, to show that each integral is negative we need merely establish that each
integrand is negative over its range of integration. The first integrand is strictly negative since the
marginal-cost curve of firm i shifts vertically downward. The second integrand is the net vertical
shift in the marginal costs curves of firms i and j. Since this net vertical shift must be exactly offset
by the net induced change in marginal costs, we can show that the net shift is weakly negative
(∆i + ∆j ≤ 0) by establishing that the net induced change in marginal costs is weakly positive.
That it is weakly positive follows since marginal costs curves are weakly convex and the firm with
the weakly steeper marginal-cost curve expands its initially larger output by as much as the other
firm contracts its initially smaller output.
The final two terms reflect the additional change in industry costs that would occur when the
outputs of the two firms re-equilibrate. Combined, these two terms are strictly negative. To see
this, note first that since qFi − q
I
i = q
I
j − q
F
j > 0, each term is integrated over an interval of the
same width. Denote the common width as δ > 0. Since marginal-cost curves are weakly increasing,
∫ qF
i
qIi
(ci(s) + ∆i) ds −
∫ qI
j
qFj
(cj(s) +∆j) ds ≤ δ
[(
ci(q
F
i ) +∆ı
)
−
(
cj(q
F
j ) + ∆j
)]
.
We complete the proof by verifying that the factor on the right in square brackets is strictly
negative. Since the two firms begin with equal outputs and firm i expands while firm j contracts,
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firm i produces a strictly larger final output and must have a strictly smaller final realized marginal
cost: [(ci(q
F
i ) + ∆i)− (cj(q
F
j ) + ∆j)] < 0. Hence,
∫ qF
i
qI
i
(ci(s) +∆i) ds −
∫ qI
j
qF
j
(cj(s) + ∆j) ds < 0.
Since the term in square brackets is θFi −θ
F
j , which is strictly negative, we conclude that the change
in industry costs resulting from a regressive transfer must be strictly negative.18 This establishes
that a regressive transfer must strictly decrease industry costs and hence must strictly increase
industry profit and social surplus (Proposition 2). 2
Figure 2 illustrates why a regressive transfer must strictly lower industry production costs. The
horizontal rectangular areas shaded light gray depict the changes in production costs at each firm
if outputs remained fixed at their initial levels. The vertical areas depict the changes in production
costs at each firm which occur after outputs adjust to their final equilibrium levels.
The area of the lower horizontal rectangle measures the cost reduction that would occur following
the downward shift of ∆i in the marginal-cost curve of the lower marginal-cost firm (firm i). The
area of the upper horizontal rectangle measures the cost increase that would occur following the
upward shift of ∆j in the marginal-cost curve of the higher marginal-cost firm (firm j). The area of
the increase in cost is smaller since the magnitude of the height ∆j is smaller than the magnitude of
the height ∆i and the width of the upper rectangle is smaller than the width of the lower rectangle.
When the quantities re-equilibrate, firm i will expand while the firm j will contract. The
vertical areas under the two final marginal-cost curves in Figure 2 measure the induced change in
each firm’s production costs. The cost reduction induced at the contracting firm clearly exceeds
the cost increase induced at the expanding firm. To verify this, note that even if we overstated
the cost increase and understated the cost reduction, the induced industry cost change would be
negative. To overstate the cost increase, replace the “trapezoidal” actual area under the lower
final marginal-cost curve by the right-hand vertical rectangle; the white “triangular” area measures
the size of the overstatement of the true cost increase. To understate the cost reduction, replace
the actual ‘trapezoidal” area under the higher final marginal-cost curve by the left-hand vertical
rectangle; the white “triangular” area measures the size of the understatement of the true cost
18Recall that, when discussing the total differential in equation (2), we reached a similar conclusion when the shifts
in realized marginal costs were local.
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decrease. Both rectangles have the same width but the left-hand rectangle must have a larger
height (since in the final equilibrium, the firm with the lower realized marginal cost must have the
larger output). Hence, the cost change reflected in these rectangular areas must be negative. The
true induced cost change must be even more negative than these two rectangular areas (by the
sum of the two white “triangular” areas). Since industry costs would fall even if the outputs of
the two firms did not change in response to the shifts in the marginal-cost curves shift and must
fall further when outputs re-equilibrate, a regressive transfer of realized marginal costs necessarily
lowers industry costs.
Harnessing the Two Types of Transformations
We now present the key result in the paper.
Proposition 7: Given two vectors of realized marginal costs generated in Cournot equilibrium
by vertically shifting the marginal-cost curves of two or more firms, if (1) one vector (denoted x)
majorizes the other (denoted y), (2) x is generated in an interior equilibrium, (3) x↑ 6= y↑, and (4)
when x is re-indexed so its components ascend, the underlying marginal-cost curves are contained
in ξ, then x is associated with a strictly lower industry cost and hence a strictly higher industry
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profit and social surplus.
Proof: Re-index y so that its components correspond to those in the (re-indexed) majorizing
vector. The set of marginal-cost curves underlying the reindexed y will then also be elements of ξ.
We can vertically shift those curves via a finite sequence of order-creating progressive permutations
until an ascending permutation of the re-indexed majorized vector is generated (Lemma 2). We
can then further vertically shift these curves via a finite sequence of order-preserving regressive
transfers until x↑ is generated (Lemma 3). Since permutations do not alter the largest component
of a vector while regressive transfers weakly increase that component, it follows that the largest
component of x↑ weakly exceeds the largest component of every prior vector in this sequence. Since
by assumption x is generated in an interior equilibrium, every previous equilibrium in the sequence
must also be interior. Since no transformation in this sequence raises industry cost and since some
transformations in the sequence strictly reduce it (Propositions 5 and 6), the majorizing vector
must have associated with it a lower industry cost and hence a strictly higher industry profit and
social surplus. 2
To illustrate, consider the following three vectors of realized marginal costs generated in interior
Cournot equilibrium with stationary demand by vertically shifting the marginal-cost curves of the
six firms: (27, 3, 4, 17, 7, 2), (3, 5, 22, 13, 10, 7), (10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10). It is straightforward to verify
that the first vector majorizes the second and the second majorizes the third (and hence, by tran-
sitivity, that the first majorizes the third).19 Denote the three vectors, respectively, as x, y, and z.
Re-index the majorizing vector x so that its components are in ascending order. Then, if the re-
indexed underlying marginal-cost curves are contained in ξ, it follows from Proposition 7 that the
Cournot equilibrium associated with x has a strictly higher social surplus and industry profit than
the Cournot equilibrium associated with y which in turn has a strictly higher social surplus and
industry profit than the Cournot equilibrium associated with z.
In the previous example, the vector with equal components was majorized by each of the other
19The vector of partial sums of x↑ is (2,5,9,16,33,60) and of y↑ is (3,8,15,25,38,60) and of z↑ is (10,20,30,40,50,60).
Since the first is Pareto dominated by the second and the second by the third, z ≺ y ≺ x.
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two vectors. This is not a coincidence, and it suggests the following result:
Lemma 4: For x, y ∈ <n, if y is a vector of equal components and
∑n
i=1 xi =
∑n
i=1 yi, then y is
majorized by x.
Proof: Suppose not. Then there exists some j < n such that
∑j
i=1 y(i) <
∑j
i=1 x(i). For, otherwise,
the definition of majorization would be satisfied. Suppose this jth partial sum is, in fact, the first
such partial sum. Then it must be the case that y(j) < x(j). Since the components of y↑ are the
same, whereas those of x↑ are weakly increasing, it follows that y(k) ≤ x(k) for all j < k ≤ n. But
this implies
∑n
i=1 y(i) <
∑n
i=1 x(i), which contradicts the assumption that
∑n
i=1 x(i) =
∑n
i=1 y(i).
2
The economic significance of Lemma 4 is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 8: For all (c1(q1), . . . , cn(qn)) ∈ ξ that result in an interior equilibrium with the
same realized marginal-cost sum, the equal-component vector of realized marginal costs maximizes
industry costs and hence minimizes industry profit and social surplus.
Proof: The result follows immediately from Proposition 7 and Lemma 4. 2
Proposition 8 generalizes Corollary 4 in Salant-Shaffer (1999) to non-constant marginal-cost curves
within ξ.20
Given the link between the profitability and social surplus of Cournot equilibria and majoriza-
tion, it would be useful to have a graphical test to determine whether one vector of realized marginal
costs majorizes another. Lorenz curves of realized marginal-cost vectors serve this purpose.
We illustrate how the Lorenz curve is constructed for the realized marginal-cost vector x. Plot
the following points:
(
k/n, Sxk/S
x
n
)
, for k = 0, . . . , n where x(0) ≡ 0, and S
x
k =
∑k
i=0 x(i). Then
connect adjacent points with straight line segments. That is, vertical components of the Lorenz
curve consist of n+1 points: zero and the n partial sums of x, normalized by the component sum.
The Lorenz curves for y and z are constructed in a similar fashion (with the same normalization
20A related result can be obtained when marginal-cost curves are not in ξ by beginning with a vector of identical
realized marginal costs and applying Proposition 3 iteratively until no two firms have the same realized marginal
cost.
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factor since Syn = S
z
n = S
x
n). Each curve is a graphical representation of the normalized partial
sums corresponding to the given ordered vector, in this case, x↑, y↑, and z↑, respectively. Thus,
for instance, to say y is majorized by x implies that the graph associated with y↑ lies everywhere
weakly above the Lorenz curve associated with x↑, as illustrated in Figure 3 above.
IV Duality Between Realized Marginal Costs and Outputs
In any regressive transfer of realized marginal costs, the firm with the smaller initial output will
contract and the firm with the larger initial output will expand, while none of the other firms will
change its output. Since industry output remains constant, a regressive transfer of output also
occurs. Similarly, in any regressive transfer of output (firm i’s output expands and firm h’s output
contracts by offsetting amounts with no change in the outputs of the remaining firms), a regressive
transfer of realized marginal cost also occurs. This suggests there may be a duality relationship
between vectors of realized marginal costs and the associated vectors of outputs.
We now state our main result of this section:
Proposition 9: Suppose the initial and final equilibrium are interior. Then θI is majorized by θF
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if and only if qI is majorized by qF.
Proof: Since qI, qF ∈ <n++, the first order conditions hold with equality. That is, θ
J
i = P +
P ′qJi for J = I, F, and i = 1, . . . , n where P > 0 and P
′ < 0 are constants. The result then follows
since if the vector x majorizes the vector y and every component of each vector is subjected to the
same linear affine transformation so as to produce two transformed vectors, then the transformation
of the vector x majorizes the transformation of the vector y (Marshall-Olkin, 1979, p.9).21 2
Proposition 9 establishes that when the initial and final equilibrium are interior, an initial vector
of realized marginal cost is majorized by a final vector of realized marginal cost if and only if the
associated initial vector of output is majorized by the associated final vector of output. Thus,
for example, the realized marginal cost vector (3, 2, 4) majorizes the vector (3, 3, 3). Suppose that
P = 10 and P ′ = −1. Then the associated output vectors will be (7, 8, 6) and (7, 7, 7). As can
be verified, the output vector associated with the majorizing realized marginal-cost vector itself
majorizes the other output vector. This duality result expands the scope of our earlier analysis
since inferences about industry cost, profit, and social surplus can be drawn from observations of
firm outputs instead of their realized marginal costs. Proposition 7 can be recast as follows:
Proposition 10: Given two output vectors generated in Cournot equilibrium by vertically shifting
the marginal-cost curves of two or more firms, if (1) one vector (denoted q) majorizes the other
(denoted r), (2) q is generated in an interior equilibrium, (3) q↑ 6= r↑, and (4) when q is re-
indexed so its components descend, the underlying marginal-cost curves are contained in ξ, then
q is associated with a strictly lower industry cost and hence a strictly higher industry profit and
social surplus.
Since a realized marginal-cost vector of equal components implies a corresponding output vector
with equal components, Proposition 8 implies that the vector of equal outputs minimizes industry
21Since P ′ < 0, if θJ is arranged in ascending order then the corresponding output vector will be arranged in
descending order. This implies that the vector of partial sums of θJ Pareto dominate the vector of partial sums of θK
if and only if
∑m
i
qJ[i] ≤
∑m
i
qK[i], for all m = 1, ..., n, where q
J
[i] (respectively, q
K
[i]) denotes the ith component of the
output vector which is obtained from qJ (respectively, qK) by arranging it in descending order. Thus, as Marshall
and Olkin note, this equivalence implies that the two conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the vector x to
be majorized by the vector y can also be written as (1)
∑m
i
x[i] ≤
∑m
i
y[i], m = 1, ..., n, and (2)
∑n
i
x[i] =
∑n
i
y[i].
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profit and social surplus. We state this implication in the following proposition:
Proposition 11: For all (c1(q1), . . . , cn(qn)) ∈ ξ that result in an interior equilibrium with the
same output sum, the equal-component equilibrium vector of outputs maximizes industry costs and
hence minimizes industry profit and social surplus.
Since realized marginal costs must decrease (respectively, increase) at any firm whose output
increases (respectively, decreases), a rearrangement of output among firms with realized marginal
costs that are initially equal is tantamount to transferring output from a higher cost firm to a
lower cost firm. This lowers industry costs and hence raises industry profit and social surplus.
Thus, for example, if firms in a triopoly facing stationary demand experience vertical shifts in their
respective marginal-cost curves so that their equilibrium outputs change from (5, 5, 5) to (1, 1, 13),
then industry profit and social surplus must increase.
Schur-Convexity and Concentration Indices
Industry profit and social surplus are examples of functions that increase (over the restricted domain
of vectors associated with interior equilibria) when one vector in the domain is replaced by another
which majorizes it. Following standard usage, we refer to any function that preserves the ordering
of majorization as “Schur-convex.”22 Dalton (1920) showed that the sum of squared components
of a vector is also Schur-convex: if one Lorenz curve lies weakly below another, the sum of the
squared components of the underlying vector must be larger.
Our duality result has an important implication for concentration indices such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index which are used to signal changes in industrial performance. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman index is the sum of the squares of each firm’s output expressed as a proportion of
industry output. As shown by Encaoua-Jacquemin (1980), the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is a
22As Marshall-Olkin (1979, p. 14) point out, “Schur-increasing” would be clearer terminology were it not for the
fact that “Schur-convex” is in widespread use. Schur (1923) showed that a function φ : <n+ → <, with continuous
first partial derivatives, is convex in the sense that
(
c¯ ≺ cˆ implies φ(c¯) ≤ φ(cˆ)
)
if and only if the function takes on
the same value for all permutations of c¯ ∈ <n+ and satisfies (c¯1 − c¯2)
(
∂φ(c¯)
∂c¯1
−
∂φ(c¯)
∂c¯2
)
≥ 0. For example, if firm 1’s
realized marginal cost is strictly larger than firm 2’s realized marginal cost, so that c¯1 − c¯2 > 0, then this condition
is satisfied if a local increase in c¯1 and corresponding decrease in c¯2 does not decrease the value of the function. If
it strictly increases the value of the function—as it does for industry profit and social surplus–the function is said to
be strictly Schur-convex. See Berge (1963) at pages 219-227 for a more complete discussion of Schur-convexity.
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member of a class of “allowable” concentration indices which are invariant to permutations of
market shares between firms but which increase whenever the distribution of market shares in the
industry experiences a mean preserving spread. All such indices are, therefore, Schur-convex. It
follows that:
Proposition 12: Under the four hypotheses of Proposition 10, the majorizing vector of outputs will
cause every allowable concentration index to increase even though industrial performance improves
as measured not only by industry profit but also by social surplus.
The conventional practice of interpreting an increase in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the “en-
tropy index” (Tirole, p. 222) or any other allowable concentration index as a signal of a decline in
industrial performance, therefore, lacks theoretical support.
Proposition 12 considerably generalizes Corollary 2 in Salant-Shaffer (1999), which is restricted
to changes in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index under constant marginal costs.
V Conclusion
In this paper, we have described a new way to determine qualitatively how industry cost, industry
profit and social surplus change when vertical shifts displace the marginal-cost curves of Cournot
competitors. Previous results (Salant-Shaffer, 1999) required that (1) both equilibria be interior,
(2) both sums of realized marginal costs be identical, and (3) the marginal-cost curve of each firm be
linear with a common slope. Under these three assumptions, the qualitative changes of interest can
always be inferred from the change in the variance of the realized marginal costs. The requirement
that each marginal-cost curve be linear with a common slope (typically zero), however, seems to us
very restrictive and we have relaxed it (while maintaining the other two requirements). Under our
weaker assumptions we have shown how qualitative conclusions about industry cost, profit, and
surplus can nonetheless sometimes be reached.
Admittedly, the new criterion that we discuss cannot be used to compare any two vectors
of realized marginal costs with the same component sum since their associated Lorenz curves
may cross. Majorization is a partial ordering. In this respect, it may appear inferior to the
25
“variance criterion.” After all, given two vectors with the same component sum one can always
determine which has the larger variance even if neither vector Lorenz dominates the other. One
must remember, however, that changes in the variance of the realized marginal-cost vector do not
always have economic significance.
An illustration will be helpful. Recall from section II the pair of realized marginal-cost vectors
(2− , 2, 5+ ) and (1, 4, 4). They have the same component sum and, for  > 0, the former vector
has the larger sum of squared components and variance. Nonetheless, for 0 <  < 1, their Lorenz
curves cross and provide no guidance about which vector is associated with the higher industry
profit and social surplus.23 Hence, one can rank the vectors by the sum of their squared components
(or, equivalently, by their variance) but one cannot rank them by majorization. If these two realized
marginal-cost vectors were generated by vertical shifts of marginal-cost curves which are weakly
increasing parallel lines, then being able to rank the vectors by the variance criterion is advantageous
because whenever the variance increases industry costs decline (Salant-Shaffer, 1999)—whether or
not the associated Lorenz curves cross. However, if the two realized marginal-cost vectors were
instead generated by vertical shifts of marginal-cost curves of the form ci(qi) = ai+dq
2
i , then being
able to rank them by the variance criterion is disadvantageous since, as Proposition 4 reflects,
changes in that criterion are unrelated to changes in economic variables of interest.
In principle, there may exist some other complete ordering of realized marginal-cost vectors
with the same component sum which does correctly indicate in all cases which vector is associated
with the larger industry cost. The existence or non-existence of such a ranking is an open question
to be addressed in future work.
In conclusion, something should be said about the requirement that for comparisons to be valid
using the Lorenz criterion (or the variance), the sum of realized marginal costs (or realized output)
must not change. Comparisons may still be possible using these approaches when the sum of
marginal costs does change; but the comparisons then must rely not merely on these criteria but
on additional information. Suppose, for example, that vertical shifts in the marginal-cost curves
23The vectors of partial sums are, respectively, (2− ,4− ,9) and (1, 5, 9), so for 0 <  < 1, neither vector Pareto
dominates the other.
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of firms result in a decline in the sum of realized marginal costs. Denote the initial marginal-cost
vector as x and the final marginal-cost vector as y. It may be possible to devise a hypothetical
marginal-cost vector yˆ which has the same component sum as the final vector y but which can
be compared by some other method to the initial vector x to determine whether industry profit or
social surplus has increased. In many such cases, we can compare x to y using the Lorenz criterion
even though the sum of realized marginal costs changes: we would compare x to yˆ using the other
method, yˆ to y using the Lorenz criterion and then, by transitivity, would indirectly be able to
compare x to y despite the change in their marginal-cost sum. Such comparisons are analogous to
those made all the time in demand theory (Allen-Hicks, 1934): the sign of the substitution that
would occur at unchanged real income is useful in determining the sign of the change in demand
induced by a price increase even though the price increase causes a change in real income.24
24By analogy to our case, one supplements the information that the Hicksian substitution effect is negative with
additional information about the income effect and then combines the two using transitivity. In particular, the
substitution effect indicates how demand would change if the price increased and yet utility did not change (the analog
to our discussion of the profit and surplus consequences if the marginal-cost sum did not change); one then brings in
supplemental informatin that the good is “normal.” Combining the two pieces of information using transitivity, we
conclude that the final demand will be strictly smaller than the initial demand.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
By hypothesis, firm i’s marginal-cost curve shifts down and firm j’s marginal-cost curve shifts up
(with no shifts to the marginal-cost curves of other firms) so that firm i’s output expands by x > 0
and firm j’s output contracts by x. Denote the vertical shift in firm i’s marginal-cost curve as
∆i < 0 and the vertical shift in firm j’s marginal-cost curve as ∆j > 0. Then since industry output
does not change and the marginal-cost curves of the other n − 2 firms do not shift, the change in
industry costs can be written as:
∫ qFi
0
(ci(s) +∆i) ds +
∫ qFj
0
(cj(s) + ∆j) ds −
∫ qIi
0
ci(s) ds −
∫ qIj
0
cj(s) ds
=
∫ qI
i
qI
j
∆i ds +
∫ qI
j
0
(∆i +∆j) ds+
∫ qF
i
qI
i
(ci(s) + ∆i) ds −
∫ qI
j
qF
j
(cj(s) +∆j) ds. (A.1)
We now show that the right-hand side of this expression is strictly negative.
The first definite integral is zero since its upper and lower limits are identical. In each of the
other three definite integrals, the upper limit strictly exceeds the lower limit.
The second integral is weakly negative since its integrand is weakly negative. To verify this,
note that the overall change in the realized marginal cost at either firm can be decomposed into (1)
the change that would occur if its marginal-cost curve shifted vertically with no change in output
and (2) the additional change that occurs when its output re-equilibrates. By hypothesis, firm i’s
expansion by x and firm j’s contraction by x would weakly increase the marginal-cost sum if neither
marginal-cost curve shifted. But since, by a second hypothesis of Proposition 3, the sum of the
realized marginal costs at the two firms does not change, the weakly positive induced change in the
sum of the two marginal costs must be exactly offset by a weakly negative sum of the exogenous
shifts in the two marginal-cost curves: ∆i +∆j ≤ 0.
The final two terms combined are strictly negative. To see this, note first that since qFi − q
I
i =
qIj − q
F
j > 0, each term is integrated over an interval of the same width. Denote the common width
as δ > 0. Since marginal-cost curves are weakly increasing,
∫ qFi
qI
i
(ci(s) + ∆i) ds −
∫ qIj
qF
j
(cj(s) +∆j) ds ≤ δ
[(
ci(q
F
i ) +∆ı
)
−
(
cj(q
F
j ) + ∆j
)]
.
28
We complete the proof by verifying that the factor on the right in square brackets is strictly
negative. Since the two firms begin with equal outputs and firm i expands while firm j contracts,
firm i produces a strictly larger final output and must have a strictly smaller final realized marginal
cost: [(ci(q
F
i ) + ∆i)− (cj(q
F
j ) + ∆j)] < 0. Hence,
∫ qFi
qI
i
(ci(s) +∆i) ds −
∫ qIj
qF
j
(cj(s) + ∆j) ds < 0.
We conclude, therefore, that the industry cost change (the right-hand side of (A.1)) is strictly
negative. Under the hypotheses of Proposition 3, the initial equilibrium with equal marginal costs
at every firm can be improved upon in terms of both profit and social surplus. 2
Weak Majorization
We have considered a strong form of majorization in which the sum of the components in each
vector must be the same. Under weak majorization, the sum of the components in each vector is
allowed to differ. The reader may thus wonder whether the relationship we have identified between
the strong form of majorization and industry profit and social surplus would also hold for weak
majorization. To address this, we define weak majorization as (Marshall-Olkin, 1979):
Definition: For x, y ∈ <n, x is weakly majorized by y (or equivalently, y weakly majorizes x),
written x ≺w y, if and only if the vector of partial sums of x Pareto dominates the vector of partial
sums of y.
The reader might conjecture that if x weakly majorizes y, then the final equilibrium would still
involve strictly higher social surplus and industry profit. This conjecture is false. Suppose two
ascending vectors of realized marginal costs differ only in their last component. If the final vector
has the smaller nth component then it weakly majorizes the initial vector. Nonetheless, we now
show that the final equilibrium may have a strictly smaller social surplus and industry profit.25
To see this, consider the following example where ci(q) = ai+b(q), for ai ≥ 0, b
′(·) ≥ 0, and b′′(·) ≥
0. Differentiate the expression for social surplus with respect to the vertical intercept of the nth
25This not only generalizes to the non-constant marginal-cost case the main result in Yuan-Khan (2000) but also
shows that a proposition corresponding to their social-surplus result holds for industry profit as well.
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marginal-cost curve. Since W =
∫Q
0 P (u)du−
∑n
i=1
∫ qi
0 [ai + b(u)]du,
dW
dan
=
n−1∑
i=1
(P (Q)− ci(qi))
dqi
dan
+ (P (Q)− cn(qn))
dqn
dan
− qn, (A.2)
where we have used the fact that dQ
dan
=
∑n−1
i=1
dqi
dan
+ dqn
dan
. Consider an interior Cournot equilibrium
among n − 1 firms with different realized marginal costs. Now add one more firm with a realized
marginal cost equal to the price in this equilibrium. That firm will produce zero and the equilibrium
price will remain the same. Now vertically shift the marginal-cost curve of the additional firm
downward marginally so that its realized marginal cost is lower. Its output will expand and the
output of each of the other n−1 firms will contract. The resulting marginal change in social surplus
is given by (A1). By hypothesis, the last two terms in (A1) are zero: qn = 0 and P (Q)−cn(qn) = 0.
Since the first term is strictly positive, dWdan > 0. Thus, when an is reduced, social surplus is
reduced even though the final vector of realized marginal costs weakly majorizes the initial vector.
Intuitively, the marginal expansion at firm n has no first-order effect on net social surplus since the
marginal cost at firm n equals the market price; however, the induced marginal contraction at each
of the other firms strictly lowers net surplus since each of those firms generates strictly positive net
surplus.
To verify that industry profit will be smaller as well, rewrite it as Π = W −
∫ Q
0 P (u)du+QP (Q)
and differentiate to obtain: dΠ
dan
= dW
dan
+QP ′(Q) dQ
dan
. Since the sum of the realized marginal costs
declines, industry output must increase when an is marginally reduced. Hence,
dQ
dan
< 0. Since both
terms on the right-hand side of the equation defining dΠ
dan
are strictly positive, dΠ
dan
> 0. Indeed, since
dW
dan
and dΠdan are continuous they will remain strictly positive for any an in a neighborhood below
the old equilibrium price. Thus, extension of our comparative-static results to weak majorization
is not straightforward. Nevertheless, as explained in Section V, our majorization results can be
useful even in situations where the marginal-cost sum changes.
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